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INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, DOES GENERAL AND SPECIFIC DETERRENCE PLAY IN SENTENCING 
OFFENDERS WITH AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY?  HOW CAN THESE AND THE OTHER 
SENTENCING PRINCIPLES BE APPLIED WHEN SENTENCING NOEL? 
TWISTIE VENNING* 
I INTRODUCTION 
A Noel 
Noel1 was born into a family of disability. Both his biological parents are intellectually 
disabled and as a consequence Noel himself is intellectually disabled. He is in receipt of a 
Disability Support Pension and is registered with the state based Disability Services 
Commission (DSC). Noel receives logistical and personal support from a non-government 
support agency funded by DSC. Notwithstanding Noel’s disability, he lives relatively 
independently with his maternal grandmother. He is employed with a registered Australian 
Disability Enterprise in a manufacturing environment and works full time. Noel is an avid 
computer gamer and has maintained close personal friendships from his time at mainstream 
public schools. 
For those who do not know Noel, he presents as a normal young man, however could be 
described as being ‘simple’. In 2012 (when Noel was 19 years old) he was convicted in a 
superior court of sexual offences against a child. He used social media and mobile text 
messaging in lewd conversations with a 13 year old girl and attempted to make physical 
contact with her. His intention was to have a sexual relationship with the child. His 
                                                 
*
 Law student at Charles Darwin University (CDU). Because the author is living in Western Australia (WA) but 
studying at CDU this paper will concentrate on substantive law in the jurisdictions of WA and the Northern 
Territory (NT). 
1
 Noel is a fictional character based upon a factual scenario known to the author. 
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convictions included attempting to procure the girl for sex2 and other offences related to child 
pornography.3 Noel received a community based sentence rather than imprisonment with the 
court taking into account his intellectual disability. In late 2013, Noel was again charged with 
offences of a strikingly similar nature which also breach his community based sentence. He 
has entered pleas of guilty and is awaiting sentence. He is facing the real possibility of an 
immediate prison term. 
B Defining Intellectual Disability 
1 Sociological Perspective 
Defining intellectual disability is difficult, particularly when assessing a borderline case. For 
an individual to be assessed as entitled to Commonwealth financial support for an intellectual 
disability (in the form of a Disability Support Pension (DSP)), they must meet certain 
criteria.4 In assessing this criteria the legislation applies a test using an Impairment Table.5 
The Impairment Table6 for ‘intellectual function’7 is applied to persons of ‘low intellectual 
function ([intelligence quotient] score of 70 to 85) which results in functional impairment’.89 
In assessing the level of impairment a person has, a further test is applied being an adaptive 
behaviour assessment.10 The levels of impairment are determined as being either no 
impairment, mild, moderate, severe or extreme.11 
                                                 
2
 Contrary to Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 321. 
3
 Ibid s 220. 
4
 Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) s 94. 
5
 Ibid s 94(1)(b). 
6
 Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (Cth), Social Security (Tables for 
the Assessment of Work-related Impairment for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011, 6 December 
2011 (‘Determination Tables’). 
7
 Ibid Table 9. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 The Intelligence Quotation (IQ) is to be assessed using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV or equivalent 
contemporary assessment. 
10
 Determination Tables, Table 9. 
11
 Ibid. 
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2 Medical Perspective 
When looking at a medical model for definition of intellectual disability there are two popular 
and standardised diagnostic models. Using the American published Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders fifth edition (DSM-V),12 the diagnostic criteria for intellectual 
disability has three elements.13 These elements are deficits in intellectual functions, deficits in 
adaptive behaviour and a presentation of these deficits during the developmental phase of a 
person’s life.14 The DSM-V does not place much weight upon an intelligence quotient (IQ) 
placing more emphasis on the adaptive behaviour as measured against unimpaired peers.15 
The other common used medical diagnostic tool is the International Classification of Diseases 
version 10 (ICD-10).16 The ICD-10 is published by the World Health Organisation.17 This 
tool refers to mental retardation rather than intellectual disability and places much more 
emphasis on overall intelligence rather than adaptive functioning.18 For example a person 
with an IQ between 50 and 69 would be diagnosed with mild mental retardation19 regardless 
of their ability to live independently. 
3 Legal Perspective 
It can be seen above there is a subjective and systematic test in defining intellectual disability 
when assessing for income support. Within the medical sense, there are similar tools to assess 
intellectual impairment. The same cannot be said for the assessment of intellectual disability 
in criminal law. In 1996 the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) 
                                                 
12
 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed, 2013). 
13
 Ibid 33. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid 37. 
16
 World Health Organisation, International Classification of Diseases (2014) 
<http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd/en/>. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid ‘mental retardation F70 – F79’, <http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en#/F70-F79>. 
19
 Ibid ‘mild mental retardation F70’. 
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released its report into intellectual disability in the criminal justice system.20 The 
Commission’s first recommendation was to legislate a uniform statutory definition of 
intellectual disability to be ‘“intellectual disability” means a significantly below average 
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with two or more deficits in adaptive 
behaviour’.21 This would accord with the Commonwealth’s criteria for a DSP. To date NSW 
has not implemented this recommendation. 
In Western Australia (WA) the legislative material does not define intellectual disability but 
does include this term in the definition of mental impairment.22 The situation is the same in 
the Northern Territory (NT).23 Interestingly for federal offences, the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
allows for a reduction in criminal responsibility when the accused ‘is suffering from a mental 
illness within the meaning of the civil law of the State or Territory or is suffering from an 
intellectual disability’.24 In this situation the Commonwealth allows for an intellectual 
disability to be considered regardless of the accused’s position at State or Territory law. 
In determining if an accused may have been afflicted with a mental impairment in relation to 
their offending, the question is resolved as a matter of law rather than fact. The High Court in 
Falconer held: 
Under the Code, as well as under the common law, it is necessary for the trial judge to 
determine what is meant by the terms used to describe the mental condition of a person who is 
                                                 
20
 New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC), People With an Intellectual Disability and the 
Criminal Justice System, Report No 80 (1996) (‘NSWLRC Report 80’). 
21
 Ibid ch 3. 
22
 Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA) s 8. 
23
 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 43A. 
24
 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 20BQ (emphasis added). 
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of unsound mind or insane. The meaning of those terms is a question of law, not a question to 
be answered by medical witnesses.25 
This means a defence of mental impairment must be approved before being put to a jury. If a 
judge is satisfied there is a possibility an accused is not guilty of a crime due to mental 
impairment they will allow the defence to be raised and determined by the jury on the balance 
of probabilities.26 
The High Court has preferred the use of the term ‘mentally retarded’ as opposed to 
intellectual disability.27 This is because intellectual disability can often be referred to as ‘mild’ 
however even with a mild disability the effects upon a person’s criminal conduct can be 
profound. In Muldrock28 the Court stated: 
The assessment that the appellant suffers from a ‘mild intellectual disability’ should not obscure 
the fact that he is mentally retarded. The condition of mental retardation is classified according 
to its severity as mild, moderate, severe or profound. Mental retardation is defined by reference 
to both significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning and significant limitations in 
adaptive functioning. ‘Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning’ is defined as an 
intelligence quotient (IQ or IQ-equivalent) of about 70 or below. The position is well explained 
in a discussion paper published by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission: ‘A person’s 
intellectual disability can be classified as “mild”, “moderate”, “severe” or “profound”, based 
upon certain IQ ranges. A further category, “borderline”, is also used to indicate people just 
above the mild range in terms of intellectual functioning. A person with a “severe” or 
“profound” disability may be unable to learn basic social skills such as speech, walking and 
personal care, and is likely to require supported accommodation. The majority of people with an 
                                                 
25
 R v Falconer (1990) 96 ALR 545, 557. 
26
 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 43E. 
27
 Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120. 
28
 Ibid. 
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intellectual disability have a “mild” level of intellectual disability and “can learn skills of 
reading, writing, numeracy, and daily living sufficient to enable them to live independently in 
the community”. These classifications have limited utility and can sometimes be misleading. 
For example, such terms may suggest to criminal justice personnel, who do not have a full 
understanding of the disability involved, that a “mild” intellectual disability is 
inconsequential.’29 
C Prevalence of Intellectual Disability in Australia 
As of 2012, in Australia 18 per cent of the population were living with a disability.30 
Assuming the rates have remained static this equates to over 4 million people living with a 
disability.31 Of these 4 million people, 5.6 per cent can be assumed as having an intellectual 
disability.32 This calculates to over 230 000 people living in Australia with an intellectual 
disability.33 This group represents approximately one per cent of the population.34 Of these 
people, the majority suffer from a mild disability.35 It is difficult to estimate the actual number 
of people living with an intellectual disability.36 It is believed the reported number is 
underestimated due to varying factors primarily related to many mildly intellectually disabled 
people accessing the same range of services as the rest of the community.37 
  
                                                 
29
 Ibid 137 – 138 (footnotes omitted). 
30
 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Disability, Ageing and Carers, Australia: Summary of Findings, 2012 
(ABS, Catalogue No 4430.0, 2013) data cube: Excel spreadsheet ‘Disability, Ageing and Carers, Australia: 
Disability tables’ Table 12. 
31
 Figure calculated from an estimation of population of 23,450,000 on 9 April 2014 available from the ABS 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/1647509ef7e25faaca2568a9
00154b63?OpenDocument> and then multiplying by 0.18 giving a result of 4 221 000. 
32
 ABS, above n 30, Table 12. 
33
 Figure calculated by using 4 221 000 from method above n 28, multiplying by 0.056 resulting in 236 736. 
34
 Using the population estimate from the ABS as found above n 31. 
35
 NSWLRC, above n 20, Discussion Paper No 35 (1994) [2.29]. 
36
 Susan Hayes and Gerard Craddock, Simply Criminal (The Federation Press, 2nd ed, 1992) 30 – 31. 
37
 Ibid. 
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D Intellectual Disability in the Criminal Justice System 
It is estimated intellectually disabled persons are overrepresented in the prison population by 
a factor of three to four times.38 Current Australian data is lacking in accurately defining the 
rates of intellectual disability in custodial settings. A Canadian study in 200739 found: 
Approximately one in five individuals in [the] sample fell into the probable [intellectual 
disability] (ID) range, a significantly higher rate than the 1% to 3% found in the general 
population. These results are similar to those found by Hayes (1997) in Australian local courts, 
and as would be expected, rates of probable ID were higher than those found in studies 
conducted among individuals who had already been sentenced.40 
The reason why rates of intellectual disability in custody are higher in persons prior to 
sentence is likely to be because the sentencing authority has not had the opportunity to fully 
consider the effect the person’s disability should have on their overall responsibility for the 
criminal conduct. The findings from this study suggest the overrepresentation of intellectual 
disability in pre-trial custody could be as high as 20 times when compared to unimpaired 
people.41 
II REDUCTION OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A Criminal Responsibility in Australia: Statutory Defences 
                                                 
38
 Ibid 46. 
39
 Anne Crocker et al, ‘Rate and Characteristics of Men with an Intellectual Disability in Pre-Trial Detention’ 
(2007) 32 Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disability 143. 
40
 Ibid (references omitted). 
41
 Figure calculated using an assumed population of 23 million Australians, one percent being 230 000 (the 
estimated population of Australians living with an intellectual disability). One in five equals 20 per cent. Thus 
one per cent in the general population versus 20 per cent in pre-trial custody equates to an increase by a factor of 
20. 
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It has long been held a person can only commit a crime if they have the capacity to know 
right from wrong.42 In Haughton43 the Latin maxim ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’ 
was translated to mean ‘an act does not make a man guilty of a crime, unless his mind be also 
guilty’.44 This position at common law has been amended by statutory law in each Australian 
jurisdiction45 and applies prescriptively to children under the age of 10 and the mentally 
impaired fitting the criteria of each jurisdiction. When considering this in relation to people 
with an intellectual disability, it may be tempting for an advocate to argue a person could not 
know the wrongness of their conduct and thus evade criminal responsibility for the offending. 
Within the NT the defence is referred to as mental impairment46 whereas in WA the defence 
is referred to as insanity.47 
B Establishing the Defence 
In WA a person can raise the defence of insanity if they assert at the time of the offence: 
o they did not have the capacity to know what they were doing; or 
o know what they were doing was wrong; or  
o have the capacity to control their actions.48 
The accused is presumed to be sane49 thus the burden of proof rests with the party raising the 
defence. The standard of proof required is on the balance of probabilities.50 Within the NT, 
                                                 
42
 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Lawbook Co, 2nd ed, 2005) 147. 
43
 Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476. 
44
 Ibid 491. 
45
 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 7; Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) divs 2.3.1 – 2.3.2; Children (Criminal 
Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 5; Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) pt 4; Criminal Code 
Act 1983 (NT) ss 43AP – 43AQ, 43C; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) ss 27, 29; Criminal Consolidation Act 
1935 (SA) s 269C; Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 5; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 16, 18; Children, 
Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 344; Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) 
s 20; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) ss 27, 29. 
46
 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 43C. 
47
 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 27. 
48
 Ibid. 
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the defence is called ‘mental impairment’51 and includes the same elements as above.52 The 
definition of insanity (for WA) and mental impairment (for NT) includes intellectual 
disability.53 
At common law the insanity defence is assessed using the M’Naghten rules.54 The rules 
assume a person is sane.55 A jury has to be satisfied that an accused was ‘labouring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind’ that the person did not know the conduct 
they were doing or that the conduct was wrong.56 If someone’s conduct is in response to a 
delusion, no matter how profound, the validity of the insanity defence lies with the person’s 
knowledge of the wrongness of their conduct.57 
C Sentencing Options When Defence Made Out 
In WA if an accused is successful in relying on the defence of insanity they are not convicted 
of the offence and a finding of not guilty is entered. If this occurs however, the accused may 
still be subject to further action from the courts. Some offences are prescribed to require an 
accused to be detained on a custody order.58 These are generally serious sexual or violent 
offences59 and only apply to matters before a superior court.60 In all other cases, including a 
court of summary jurisdiction, the court may make orders controlling the accused.61 
                                                                                                                                                        
49
 Ibid s 26. 
50
 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182. 
51
 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 43C. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 43A (definition of ‘mental impairment’); Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 
1913 (WA) s 1(1) (definition of ‘mental impairment’). 
54
 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 ER 718. 
55
 Ibid 722. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid 723. 
58
 Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA) s 21(a). 
59
 Ibid sch 1. 
60
 Ibid s 21(a). 
61
 Ibid ss 20, 21(b). 
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A court may release an accused unconditionally62 but in doing so must consider the 
seriousness and circumstances of the offence,63 the accused’s character, mental condition and 
antecedents,64 and the public interest.65 The court may also impose a conditional release order 
or community order66 or make a custody order.67 The making of a custody order (which is 
mandatory for some offences)68 means the accused is detained in an authorised hospital, 
declared place, detention centre or prison and subject to the order until released by the 
Governor.69 The validity of such legislation which can see a person involuntarily detained 
indefinitely has been approved by the High Court.70 
D Effective Defence? 
During the financial year of 2012 to 2013, the courts in WA made three custody orders.71 It is 
determined by the Mentally Impaired Accused Review Board (MIARB) where the person 
subject to a custody order should be detained.72 As at 30 June 2013, 37 people were subject to 
management by MIARB with 46 per cent being held in a prison rather than managed in the 
community or a hospital setting.73 Of the 37 people being managed, seven had been diagnosed 
with ‘intellectual impairment’ and six with a dual diagnosis of ‘combined intellectual 
impairment and mental illness.74 
                                                 
62
 Ibid s 22(a). 
63
 Ibid s 22(a)(i). 
64
 Ibid s 22(a)(ii). 
65
 Ibid ss 22(a)(iii). 
66
 Ibid s 22(b). 
67
 Ibid s 22(c). 
68
 Ibid s 21(a). 
69
 Ibid s 24(1). 
70
 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 28. 
71
 Mentally Impaired Accused Review Board (MIARB), Annual Report 2012 - 2013 (Government of Western 
Australia, 27 August 2013). 
72
 Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA) s 24. 
73
 MIARB, above n 71, 19. 
74
 Ibid 15. 
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Although a successful application of the defence relieves an accused person of criminal 
responsibility, it can be seen from above the accused is still liable to a loss of liberty for an 
indefinite period of time. Within WA during 2013, of those accused in confinement, eight 
were in a hospital and 17 were in gaol.75 
III SENTENCING PRINCIPLES 
A Overview of Sentencing Principles 
Once convicted of a crime an offender must be sentenced by a court.76 Each jurisdiction has a 
wide range of options available which include releasing an offender without penalty77 through 
to imprisonment.78 There are four general purposes in sentencing an offender.79 These are 
punishment, deterrence of the offender and others, rehabilitation and protection of the 
community.80 With the exception of WA, each jurisdiction has these (or similar) sentencing 
principles contained within their sentencing legislation.81 In WA the principles are still 
applied under common law.82 
When formulating a sentence the courts sometimes have difficulty in balancing the general 
purposes. The High Court has stated: 
                                                 
75
 Ibid 19. 
76
 The time in which this should occur varies depending on the jurisdiction. For example in Western Australia an 
offender is to be sentenced within six months of conviction (Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 16(2)) whereas in 
Victoria a sentencing authority can adjourn sentence for up to five years (Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 72(1)). 
77
 See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 19B; Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 12; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 46. 
78
 See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 17A. 
79
 GL Davies and KM Raymond, ‘Do Current Sentencing Practices Work?’ (2000) 24 Criminal Law Journal 
236, 238. 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A; Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW) s 3A; Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9; Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10; Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5. 
82
 Lauritsen v The Queen (2000) 22 WAR 442, [53]. 
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the purposes overlap and none of them can be considered in isolation from the others when 
determining what is an appropriate sentence in a particular case. They are guideposts to the 
appropriate sentence but sometimes they point in different directions.83 
B Punishment 
One aim of sentencing is punishment. To punish someone is ‘to subject [them] to a penalty, 
… loss, … confinement, etc., for some offence, transgression, or fault’.84 There are two 
perceptions when imposing punishment that are useful in determining the sentence to be 
imposed. Firstly the punishment should be perceived by victims and the community that the 
offender ‘suffer[s] in proportion to the harm the he or she has done’.85 This is reflected within 
the sentencing legislation of all jurisdictions save WA.86 The second, and sometimes difficult 
aspect, is to ensure the offender themselves feels as though they have been punished.87 This is 
problematic as it relies on the offenders own perception of the sentence.88 Many offenders 
justify their criminal conduct and perceive themselves as the victims of the judicial system.89 
The justification for punishment can be described as a ‘backward-looking approach’ to 
criminal conduct as it addresses past behaviour.90 
  
                                                 
83
 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 476. 
84
 Macquarie Dictionary, (Pan MacMillan Australia, 6th ed, 1 October 2013) (definition of ‘punish’). 
85
 Honor Figgis, Hot Topics: Sentencing (Legal Access Information Centre, Issue 28, 2000) 3. 
86
 See eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(K) ‘the need to ensure that the person is adequately punished for 
the offence’. 
87
 GL Davies and KM Raymond, ‘Do Current Sentencing Practices Work?’ (2000) 24 Criminal Law Journal 
236, 238. 
88
 Ibid. 
89
 David Indermaur, ‘Offender Psychology and Sentencing’ (1996) 31 Australian Psychologist 15, 17. 
90
 Anthony Amatrudo, Criminology and Political Theory (SAGE Publications, 1st ed, 2009) 66. 
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C Deterrence 
Deterrence ‘can be described as the avoidance of a given action through fear of the perceived 
consequences’.91 It can be categorised as general and specific.92 General deterrence is that 
which effects society as a whole or a cohort of it whereas specific deterrence refers to an 
individual offender.93 Deterrence can be described as a ‘forward-looking approach’ to 
criminal conduct as its aim is to reduce future offending.94 
1 General Deterrence 
General deterrence can be further categorised into two types: absolute and marginal. 
(a) Absolute General Deterrence 
Absolute deterrence is the concept that the possibility of detection and punishment of a crime 
is a deterring factor for most people in society.95 The deterrence is based on any punishment, 
not just severe punishment. There is good evidence for an ‘inverse relationship’ between 
violent offences and the use of imprisonment.96 There is no correlation between the length of 
incarceration with that factor being irrelevant.97 There is an argument absolute deterrence has 
no effect upon crime because it only deters people who would not commit crime in any 
event.98 This has been disproved. During 1923 in Melbourne, police went on strike resulting 
in one in three police officers of the Victorian police being sacked.99 The result was a crime 
spree involving many normally law-abiding citizens that was allayed after two days of 
                                                 
91
 Donald Ritchie, Sentencing Matters. Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the Evidence (Sentencing 
Advisory Council, April 2011) 7. 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 Amatrudo, above n 90, 71. 
95
 Richard Edney and Mirko Bagaric, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 62 – 63. 
96
 Ibid 62. 
97
 Ibid 62 – 63. 
98
 Ibid. 
99
 Ibid. 
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intensive law enforcement. Comparable events occurred in England in 1919 and Denmark in 
1944. The conclusion from these events was there appears to be ‘many citizens who would 
readily break the law if they could do so with impunity’.100 It has been found absolute 
deterrence is effective and alive and well within our community.101 
(b) Marginal General Deterrence 
When courts address ‘general deterrence’, it is marginal general deterrence that they are 
speaking of, not absolute.102 General deterrence is given weight on the belief that ‘people are 
rational beings’ who make choices after calculating the possible consequences of their 
behaviour.103 It is very common for sentencing courts to address ‘general deterrence’ as 
sending a message to the community that certain criminal conduct will result in an 
imprisonment term of a certain length.104 The High Court has stated general deterrence is the 
primary purpose of the criminal law.105 
2 Specific Deterrence 
Specific deterrence (also referred to as personal deterrence) aims to change an offender’s 
behaviour by imposing a punishment that the offender will ‘seek to avoid in the future’.106 It 
applies intensely on violent offences107 and recidivist offenders; where it can be said previous 
                                                 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Ibid 62. 
102
 Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘(Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work – And What it Means For 
Sentencing’ (2011) 35 Criminal Law Journal 269, 270 (‘Deterrence Doesn’t Work’). 
103
 Amatrudo, above n 90, 72. 
104
 See, eg, The State of Western Australia v Undalghumen [2014] WASCSR 77, [19] ‘this Court has repeatedly 
stated that sentences of imprisonment should be imposed in order to deter others’; The State of Western Australia 
v Meier [2014] WASCSR 78, [18] ‘the purpose of general deterrence is not to deter you, but others from 
committing similar crimes, and that remains a significant factor’; The State of Western Australia v Rimington 
[2014] WASCSR 92, [27] ‘General deterrence is the dominant sentencing factor in a case of arson’. 
105
 Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561, 569. 
106
 Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape the Behaviour of 
Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might and the Implications For Sentencing’ (2012) 
36 Criminal Law Journal 159, 159 (‘Criminal Sanctions to Shape Behaviour’). 
107
 Ibid 162. 
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criminal sanctions have not had any consequent effect on criminal conduct.108 When specific 
deterrence comes into play it will generally see an increase in the severity of the punishment 
imposed.109 
D Protection of the Community 
Protection of the community is a sentencing objective in certain cases. In the most extreme of 
cases there are statutory sentencing regimes in some jurisdictions that allow for indefinite 
detention.110 These jurisdictions allow for some offenders to be incarcerated indefinitely 
because of the danger they pose to society. Under the common law, an indefinite preventative 
detention order is impermissible.111 In the case of Veen112 it was held such a sentence would 
violate the principle of proportionality; that is a sentence must be proportionate to the 
crime.113 It was also stated in Veen that a jurisdiction could legislate, as some of them have, 
for such a scheme which would not be unconstitutional.114 Notwithstanding the validity of 
such legislation, it is the opinion of the High Court that such a sentence must only be imposed 
‘sparingly’ and in cases where it is obviously required.115 In finite sentences, protection of the 
community is a factor that can be considered as long as it does not increase the penalty 
beyond what is proportionate.116 
  
                                                 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 65; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 163; Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
Act 1988 (SA) ss 22 – 23; Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 19; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 18A; Sentencing Act 
1995 (WA) s 98. 
111
 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 473. 
112
 Ibid. 
113
 Ibid 472. 
114
 Ibid 486. 
115
 Buckley v The Queen (2006) 224 ALR 416, 427. 
116
 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472. 
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E Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is another forward-looking consideration in sentencing.117 The aim is to effect 
change in an offender’s behaviour through addressing individual criminogenic needs. For 
example an offender may have an addiction to alcohol and their criminal conduct is in pursuit 
of obtaining that substance. An effective rehabilitation outcome for an offender of this type is 
one that addresses the alcohol use so it is no longer problematic. The primary issue with 
having rehabilitation as a sentencing consideration is there is little evidence to prove that it is 
achievable.118 
IV SPECIFIC DETERRENCE IN OFFENDERS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
A Aim of Specific Deterrence 
Specific deterrence is an attempt to effect change in an offender’s future behaviour.119 It is 
given more weight for recidivist offenders where it can be demonstrated from their criminal 
history the offence they are being sentenced for is not an aberration of their behaviour. In 
Veen the High Court stated: 
It is legitimate to take account of the antecedent criminal history when it illuminates the moral 
culpability of the offender in the instant case, or shows his dangerous propensity or shows a 
need to impose condign punishment to deter the offender and other offenders from committing 
further offences of a like kind.120 
Specific deterrence is not without its opponents. The judicial system has been criticised by 
other professionals for maintaining a sentencing system that has little evidence its principle of 
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specific deterrence works.121 By following the doctrine of legal precedent this does little to 
evolve sentencing methods in line with the scientific evidence of what works.122 
B Special Consideration for Intellectual Disability 
Recidivism of similar offences is likely to draw more attention of a sentencing authority 
towards specific deterrence.123 This raises a concern when a person’s repetitive behaviour 
may be significantly affected by an intellectual disability. Many people with an intellectual 
disability display increased impulsivity and subsequent repetitive behaviours.124 Comparing 
offenders that have an intellectual disability with those that do not, it has been found the 
disabled person is five times more likely to commit a violent offence.125 This requires 
sentencing authorities to consider the limited effect specific deterrence will have upon an 
intellectually disabled offender. In Payne v The Queen 126 the WA Court of Criminal Appeal 
stated: 
The whole notion of personal deterrence assumes some rational analysis or reasoning in the 
course of comparing the likely gains from the crime against the prospect, and likely severity, of 
punishment. Where [an] illness affects the person’s ability to make that very analysis, there is 
no justification for affording the consideration of personal deterrence the same measure of 
significance as it might have in the case of a well person.127 
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C Conflict with Rehabilitation 
Specific deterrence calls for an increase in an offender’s sentence with a view to effect a 
change to their future behaviour. This may conflict with another forward-looking 
consideration being rehabilitation. For offenders with an intellectual disability rehabilitation is 
already at a disadvantage dependent upon the offender’s level of disability.128 They may have 
problems with comprehension requiring the rehabilitative material to be in clear simple 
language.129 Memory recall could also be a barrier requiring material to be repeated and 
provided over frequent short periods.130 Perception may be an issue along with the attentive 
ability of individual offenders.131 All these factors make it more difficult to provide 
rehabilitation in a custodial setting due to the increased adverse effects upon a person with an 
intellectual disability.132 
D Does Imprisonment Deter 
Deterrence theory, whether it is specific or general, relies on the economic theory of rational 
choice.133 Bagaric and Alexander explain it is a ‘persuasive theory’ as ‘it relies upon a series 
of seemingly sound premises’.134 The premises were outlined as: 
o Humans have a strong desire to avoid hardships or pain. 
o Criminal sanctions normally involve the imposition of hardships or pain. 
o Imposing pain on offenders illustrates to people the adverse consequences stemming 
from criminal conduct. 
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o People will avoid engaging in conduct that risks pain being imposed on them. 
o The greater the potential pain, the stronger the desire to avoid being subjected to it.135 
The authors of the foregoing state it is a reasonable conclusion to determine deterrence is a 
justifiable consideration in sentencing.136 Using this logical form of argument it would be 
expected that imprisonment, specifically a term of significant length, would have a cogent 
effect upon recidivism of offenders. 
In a review of the evidence regarding the deterrent effect of imprisonment, the Sentencing 
Advisory Council in Victoria determined there was a minimal general deterrent effect from 
imprisonment.137 When analysing the ‘effectiveness of imprisonment as a specific deterrent’ 
the Council concluded ‘[t]he available research suggests that imprisonment has either no 
effect upon reoffending or a criminogenic effect’.138 The Council’s review did not discern 
between any offender cohort other than adults and young offenders. Given the lack of efficacy 
that imprisonment provides for specific deterrence in all offenders, its application to offenders 
with an intellectual disability could be seen as inappropriate. 
V (MARGINAL) GENERAL DETERRENCE IN OFFENDERS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
There is good evidence absolute general deterrence works.139 However when courts consider 
general deterrence they are talking of marginal general deterrence. This section of the paper 
will refer to marginal general deterrence only. 
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A Requirement for General Deterrence 
General deterrence is enshrined in all jurisdictions in Australia as being a relevant sentencing 
consideration. In the NT the sentencing legislation outlines ‘[t]he only purposes for which 
sentences may be imposed’140 includes ‘to discourage … other persons from committing the 
same or a similar offence’.141 In WA the same consideration is required under the common 
law.142 Invariably in most sentencing remarks there is an express acknowledgement from the 
sentencing authority regarding general deterrence and its application. This is because the High 
Court has stated ‘what is required is that the sentencer must take into account all relevant 
considerations … in forming the conclusion reached’.143 A failure to express a relevant 
consideration in a sentencing decision leaves that decision open to appeal.144 
B A Good Case for General Deterrence? 
There are some categories of offences where general deterrence is a particularly important 
factor. This includes offences that are especially prevalent within society.145 In offences that 
threaten public safety general deterrence plays a pivotal role in sentencing.146 One such case 
occurred in 1985 when an offender with very strong moral views placed a number of 
imitation bombs in schools. On the unsuccessful appeal by the offender of the sentence 
imposed the Court stated: 
The most compelling factor in sentencing the applicant was the question of general deterrence. 
It may be conceded it is extremely unlikely that the applicant would commit this type of offence 
again. … There are large groups in present day society … [that] will stop at nothing in order to 
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impose [their] views on the community, and this, in my opinion, just like hijacking, is 
calculated to become contagious, and if at the first step the courts do not show that such 
conduct, however well intended, will not be tolerated in this community, then it is unlikely that 
such behaviour will be stopped in its tracks. … [T]his is just the case where general deterrence 
has an overriding effect on the resulting sentence.147 
A further area where general deterrence can be an overarching sentencing principle is in 
offences against vulnerable victims.148 One such category of victims are offences involving 
child pornography where in a recent decision the Victorian Court of Appeal stated; ‘the 
prevalence and ready availability of pornographic material involving children, particularly on 
the internet, demands that general deterrence must be a paramount consideration’.149 Arson 
cases also draw the particular attention of general deterrence, an example of which is found in 
a decision by the WA Court of Appeal where the court stated ‘[t]he dominant sentencing 
consideration in relation to arson is one of deterrence’.150 
C Criticism from Within 
In 1985 the Attorney-General of South Australia (SA) appealed the sentence given to a young 
man convicted of causing death by dangerous driving.151 Alcohol was also involved with the 
offenders blood alcohol concentration calculated to be 0.21 per cent at the time of the offence. 
He had been sentenced in the SA District Court to a term of imprisonment of two years with 
parole eligibility after one year.152 The Crown Prosecutor submitted the ‘current sentences for 
this offence are not providing a sufficient deterrent and that sentences should be increased’.153 
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King CJ disagreed with the submission. His judgement reinforced the limited effect of 
marginal general deterrence but acknowledged absolute general deterrence when he stated: 
If a driver is not deterred from a dangerous course of driving by the threat of imprisonment for 
eighteen months or two years, is it realistic to suppose that he will be deterred by the prospect of 
two and a half or three and a half years imprisonment? The truth is that in the great majority of 
cases, he simply does not expect to be involved in a serious accident. If he thinks about it at all, 
it is the prospect of the prison gates clanging behind him rather than the duration of his 
incarceration which operates as the deterrent.154 
Former NSW District Court Judge John Nicholson SC wrote an article in 2012 where he 
heavily criticised the validity of general deterrence.155 He stated ‘[g]eneral deterrence is a 
threatening message aimed at unidentified would-be offenders somewhere out in the vast 
community who otherwise play no part in the proceedings’.156 So how does the ‘threatening 
message’ get transmitted to ‘the vast community’? It is exactly this point Mr Nicholson 
believes is a cogent flaw in the principle. He wrote: 
For general deterrence to be effective two essential steps must need to be in place. First, the 
sentence quantum constituting the deterrent message must reach the would-be offender. He 
must know about it. Secondly, the would-be offender must understand not only that the sentence 
imposed is meant to inform him of a penalty appropriate for the specific kind of offending 
conduct and offender, but also that, even though his personal circumstances are likely different, 
he too will be liable to a penalty of that order if he commits a like offence.157 
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The distribution of the message was described as ‘the ultimate media disaster’158 so why do 
sentencing authorities continue to express ‘I have taken general deterrence into account’? It is 
opined by Mr Nicholson the statement is not intended for ‘third parties’ but rather for the 
parties to the action and appeal courts.159 It was further stated ‘[q]uite frequently the nature of 
the punishment selected by the sentencing tribunal will have been reached without any 
consideration of general deterrence.’160 This was exactly the case in R v Miria.161 The 
appellate court upheld an appeal against sentence partly because the sentencing judge ‘did not 
incorporate any reflection of general deterrence among the elements constituting [the] 
sentence assessment. Such [an] omission was erroneous’.162 
D Intellectual Disability and General Deterrence 
General deterrence relies on the economic theory of rational choice as earlier described by the 
five propositions.163 It assumes the individual is capable of making rational choices based on 
sound logical information. This obviously presents difficulties when applying the deterrent 
principles on offenders who have impairment in rational decision making. It is part of the 
diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability that the individual has a lower than normal 
intellectual functioning coupled with impairment in adaptive behaviour. Naturally this effects 
the ability to make rational decisions. The common law has mollified the application of 
general deterrence applied to intellectually disabled offenders. 
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1 Muldrock 
The leading authority on general deterrence and intellectually disabled offenders is Muldrock 
v The Queen.164 In that case the appellant had pleaded guilty to a sexual offence against a 
child. The appellant was intellectually disabled. At first instance he was sentenced to a term 
of nine years imprisonment but released to parole on the day he was sentenced (taking into 
account 96 days already served). The Crown appealed the sentence. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal, in allowing the appeal, substituted the non-parole period of 96 days to one of six 
years and eight months.165 Mr Muldrock appealed to the High Court where the Court 
unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the Court of Criminal Appeal 
for sentence.166 
The High Court determined people with intellectual disabilities are an inappropriate vehicle 
for general deterrence. In citing Young CJ in R v Mooney167the Court approved the statement: 
‘General deterrence should often be given very little weight in the case of an offender suffering 
from a mental disorder or abnormality because such an offender is not an appropriate medium 
for making an example to others’.168 
Citing Lush J from the same case the Court also approved the statement ‘[a] sentence imposed 
with deterrence in view will not be acceptable if its retributive effect on the offender is felt to 
be inappropriate to his situation and to the needs of the community’.169 
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It is noted Mr Muldrock was resentenced in the Court of Criminal Appeal consistent with the 
findings of the High Court. Given he had been in custody for some time before the matter was 
finally decided, the effect of his resentencing was he was released from custody to freedom 
without the requirement for parole.170 
2 Naysmith 
A recent example of the application of Muldrock is the case of Naysmith v The Queen.171 The 
appellant had been convicted of possession of child pornography. He was intellectually 
disabled. In passing sentence in the WA District Court, Birmingham DCJ stated: 
These offences result in significant weight being given to general deterrence, and accordingly, 
less weight to personal factors such as yours. … The benefit to the community from the 
rehabilitation of an offender cannot be ignored. However, in my opinion, the community 
interest in that regard, and in respect of the individual, must give way to the very significant 
weight to be given to general deterrence, and reflect that in a sentence of immediate 
imprisonment.172 
Part of the reasons for the judge’s sentence also included his doubt the offender was suffering 
an intellectual disability of significance to his offending.173 In applying Muldrock the Court of 
Appeal held the sentencing judge erred in applying such weight to general deterrence. The 
court stated: 
                                                 
170
 R v Muldrock; Muldrock v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 108 (18 May 2012). 
171
 [2013] WASCA 32 (8 February 2013). 
172
 Ibid [20]. 
173
 Ibid [18]. 
Twistie Venning  Research Paper 2014 Student 198413 
26 
 
The appellant's intellectual disability is such as to require that little weight be given to general 
deterrence,  particularly as his disability was accompanied by significant social and 
environmental deprivation.174 
VI SENTENCING OPTIONS IN WA 
Sentencing in WA is regulated by the Sentencing Act 1995. The statutory framework does not 
include the deterrence principles however they are applied through the common law.175 The 
underlying principle is ‘[a] sentence imposed on an offender must be commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence’.176 When determining the seriousness of the offence the court is to 
take into account the penalty, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, 
and any aggravating and or mitigating factors.177 
A Non-Custodial Sentences 
1 No Sentence, Conditional Release Order and Fines 
At the lowest end of the scale a court can impose no sentence upon an offender with or 
without recording a spent conviction.178 This can only be imposed by a court when the 
offence is ‘trivial or technical’.179 Another option the court has is a conditional release order, 
formerly known as a good behaviour bond.180 A court imposing a conditional release order 
can ‘impose any requirements on the offender it decides are necessary to secure the good 
behaviour of the offender’.181 The order may also have a sum of money attached to it which is 
required to be forfeited by the offender if they do not comply with the order.182 A conditional 
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release order is not supervised by any authority.183 If an offender breaches the order by 
reoffending during its term (which can be for a maximum of two years)184 or by failing to 
comply with a condition of the order then they become liable to pay money attached to it.185 
The next form of punishment a court can impose is a pecuniary penalty in the form of a 
fine.186 When imposing a fine the court must consider the means of the offender to service a 
fine and the ‘extent to which payment of the fine will burden the offender.187  
2 Community Orders 
A community order is defined as being either a Community Based Order (CBO) or an 
Intensive Supervision Order (ISO).188 Community orders must be made for a period of time 
between six months and two years.189 A CBO must have at least one primary requirement of 
community service, supervision or programme.190 An ISO includes supervision as a 
mandatory requirement191 and may include a curfew requirement.192 Any curfew requirement 
cannot exceed a continuous period of six months.193 An ISO can also impose a community 
service and or programme requirement.194 
Community service is a requirement the offender must complete a set number of hours 
(specified by the court) of unpaid work in order to punish or rehabilitate them.195 A 
supervision requirement is imposed for the purpose of ‘regularly monitoring’ the offender 
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whilst in the community and to receive ‘regular counselling’.196 Supervision is conducted by a 
Community Corrections Officer (CCO).197 A programme requirement is a requirement an 
offender must follow the directions of a CCO regarding assessment and or treatment ‘by a 
medical practitioner, a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a social worker’ or to have an 
assessment and, if necessary, treatment for substance abuse issues.198A CCO can order an 
offender to reside at a specific place to facilitate assessment and or treatment.199 
3 Pre-Sentence Order 
A pre-sentence order (PSO) can be seen as a quasi-community order. It is an order of the 
court that an offender be subject to certain conditions before the court sentences the offender. 
It can only be imposed when a court believes the appropriate sentence is one of immediate 
imprisonment the imposition of a PSO ‘would allow the offender to address his or her 
criminal behaviour and any factors which contributed to the behaviour’ and ‘that if the 
offender were to comply with a PSO the court might not impose a term of imprisonment … 
for the offence.’200 A PSO can have supervision, programme and curfew requirements and 
must have at least one of those.201 The court can regularly review the PSO by requiring the 
offender to return to court with the benefit of a report from a CCO advising the court of the 
offender’s progress on the order.202 A PSO can be for a period of up to two years203 however 
it can be cancelled at any time during that period and the offender sentenced.204 
B Custodial Sentences 
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Imprisonment can only be imposed by a court when ‘the seriousness of the offence is such 
that only imprisonment can be justified; or the protection of the community requires it’.205 
This has been held as a principle that immediate imprisonment is the sentence of last resort.206 
The principle is also applicable at common law.207 
1 Suspended Imprisonment 
Once a court has determined the only suitable sentence is one of imprisonment it is then 
required to turn its mind to whether it is suitable to suspend the term.208 A term of 
imprisonment can be suspended when the aggregate term is no more than five years.209 The 
term of suspension cannot exceed two years.210 The effect of a suspended term means if an 
offender commits another offence during the term of suspension they may be liable to serve 
the whole of the suspended term or part of it.211 
2 Conditional Suspended Imprisonment 
The same conditions and qualifying factors apply to a conditional suspended imprisonment 
order (CSIO) as does a suspended imprisonment order.212 It can be said a CSIO is a melding 
of a suspended imprisonment order and a community order. This is because the court has the 
power to attach requirements of supervision, programme and curfew and any CSIO must have 
at least one of these requirements.213 The requirements are worded in the legislation in 
                                                 
205
 Ibid s (6)(4). 
206
 Hull v The State of WA [2005] WASCA 194 (11 October 2005), [20]. 
207
 Ibid [23]; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321, 327. 
208
 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 39(3). 
209
 Ibid s 76(1). 
210
 Ibid. 
211
 Ibid s 80. 
212
 Ibid s 81. 
213
 Ibid s 84. 
Twistie Venning  Research Paper 2014 Student 198413 
30 
 
identical terms as those are for an ISO.214 Only a prescribed court can impose a CSIO215 and 
this means only a superior court or speciality court can impose a CSIO.216 
3 Immediate Imprisonment 
A term of immediate imprisonment can only be imposed when no other sentencing option, 
including suspension of the term, is suitable.217 Any term of imprisonment imposed on a 
person must be not be six months or less except if the total aggregate term exceeds six months 
or the offender is already serving a custodial term.218 Thus the minimum term of immediate 
imprisonment is six months and one day. Once the court has decided an immediate term is the 
only suitable sentence, it must then determine if a parole eligibility order should be made.219 
(a) Parole 
The power to deny making a parole eligibility order is not absolute, rather it is enlivened by 
certain conditions.220 If the power is enlivened there is no presumption an order should not be 
made.221 The power to not make a parole eligibility order is only enlivened when at least two 
factors are present being either: 
the offence is serious; the offender has a significant criminal record; the offender, when released 
from custody under a release order made previously, did not comply with the order; and any 
other reason the court considers relevant.222 
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(b) Indefinite Detention 
A superior court that imposes a term of imprisonment for an indictable offence that is served 
immediately and for which no parole eligibility order is made may also order the offender be 
imprisoned indefinitely.223 In making an indefinite detention order the court must be satisfied 
the offender would be a danger to society.224 Indefinite detention should only be made in 
‘very exceptional cases where the exercise of the power is demonstrably necessary to protect 
society from physical harm’.225 
C Breaches of Community Orders 
If a person subject to a community order reoffends during the term of the order, they can be 
subject to further sanction.226 The court may amend, confirm or cancel the community 
order.227 If the court cancels a community order then the offender can be resentenced for the 
original matter ‘in any manner the court could have if it had just convicted the person of that 
offence’.228 If an offender fails to comply with any of their order requirements, for example 
failing to attend for assessment or treatment pursuant to a programme requirement, the court 
can also amend, confirm or cancel the community order.229 Similarly with the way a court can 
deal with the matter by way of reoffending, if the court cancels the order due to the offender 
breaching it they can resentence the offender.230 
  
                                                 
223
 Ibid s 98. 
224
 Ibid s 98(2). 
225
 Chester v R (1988) 165 CLR 611, 618. 
226
 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) ss 128 – 129. 
227
 Ibid s 130. 
228
 Ibid s 130(1)(a)(iii). 
229
 Ibid s 133. 
230
 Ibid s 133(1)(a)(iii). 
Twistie Venning  Research Paper 2014 Student 198413 
32 
 
VII SENTENCING NOEL 
In 2012 Noel was sentenced to an ISO for sexual offences against a child. He attempted to 
procure a 13 year old girl for sex through social media and mobile phone messaging. He and 
the child also swapped lewd images of themselves which resulted in Noel being convicted and 
sentenced for charges relating to child pornography. During the term of his ISO in late 2013, 
Noel committed another three counts of attempting to procure a child for sex. The victim was 
a 14 year old girl and the medium chosen by Noel was through social media. He is awaiting 
sentence for the latter charges which carry a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment.231 
A Current Options 
Because of Noel’s intellectual disability it may then be tempting for his counsel to argue he 
does not have the capacity to know his conduct was wrong. This may be a risky argument for 
Noel to put forward. Should he be successful he faces a possible custody order.232 It is almost 
certain he would not be released unconditionally under such a defence given his antecedents 
and the seriousness of the offence.233 
Child sex offences is a class of case that normally see the principle of general deterrence 
being applied strongly.234 In applying Muldrock,235 which was a case where a physical sexual 
assault occurred against a nine year old boy by an intellectually disabled man, it can be 
clearly stated general deterrence should not carry much weight in sentencing Noel due to his 
intellectual disability. Because Noel’s offending could be classed a recidivistic in nature, he 
may attract the principle of specific deterrence more than he did before.236 Given specific 
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deterrence is aimed at changing behaviour237 and effecting behaviour change is inherently 
difficult with an intellectually disabled person, it would seem logical to seek a professional 
psychological opinion on the best way to manage Noel. A court can do this by requesting a 
pre-sentence report addressing such a situation.238 
Given Noel was previously sentenced to an ISO and has reoffended during its term in a like 
manner, this is cogent evidence such a sentence is unsuitable. If the court were to cancel his 
current ISO it could also resentence him on his original matters.239 Imprisonment is an 
available sentence and unfortunately for Noel it may be the determination of the court that it 
is the only suitable sentence. It would then bring into question whether to suspend the term 
conditionally or otherwise. In dealing with the breach of the ISO, the court is required to take 
into account Noel’s responsivity to his obligations and the length of time he has been on the 
order.240 If Noel’s compliance other than the reoffending has been satisfactory, this may be 
the tipping point for the court to impose a suspended term of imprisonment. Should the court 
determine an immediate term of imprisonment is not the only option, given Noel’s offences 
and the fact he has not served a previous term of imprisonment it is highly likely he would be 
made eligible for parole. He is also not going to be subject to indefinite detention as his 
situation does not fit the exceptional criteria. 
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B Alternative Options 
John Nicholson SC wrote: 
Prosecutors, almost invariably, and defence counsel too commonly, accept that punishment is a 
most effective – and too frequently, the only – mechanism for reform of the offender, as well as 
the only method of justifiable accountability.241 
The sentencing principles applied in each jurisdiction which have long rooted histories in the 
common law focus on punitive regimes. Given Noel is not a suitable vehicle for general 
deterrence and specific deterrence is difficult to achieve, how is the community going to be 
best protected if he is not rehabilitated? What would happen if he was sent to gaol? In 
answering the latter question the evidence suggests he would come out of gaol with a higher 
risk of recidivism than before he went in.242 
It seems then the best outcome for Noel and the community is his successful rehabilitation. 
This is resource dependant in the sense he needs to have access to appropriate intervention. In 
WA the cost to the taxpayer if Noel was incarcerated for one year would be $125 925.243 If it 
were possible to divert some of this funding into a suitable community based programme for 
intellectually disabled offenders this would go a long way to achieving the ultimate aim of 
long term community protection. It would certainly be a better outcome than increasing his 
recidivism risk by a gaol term. 
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Encouragingly a 2005 study from the United Kingdom identified in roads were being made in 
community based sex offender programmes for intellectually disabled sex offenders.244 The 
study reported the formulation of a group which analysed and evaluated community 
programmes.245 One programme favourably assessed had been tailored specifically for 
intellectually disabled men in which the ‘[p]ost-course assessment revealed significant 
improvements in victim empathy, sexual attitudes and knowledge and a decrease in cognitive 
distortions’.246 If such a programme were available for Noel and sufficient resources made 
available for him to attend, this is something that could be managed with a community order 
under the current sentencing regime. Unfortunately such programmes are not available in 
WA. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Intellectual disability is prevalent in the community at a rate of approximately one percent of 
the Australian population. For intellectually disabled people in contact with the criminal 
justice system it is estimated there is an overrepresentation in the pre-trial custody setting of 
20 times and in the sentenced prisoner population of three to four times. This 
overrepresentation is a concern and highlights the importance in addressing the criminality of 
this cohort of offenders. No doubt it could be argued that some intellectually disabled people 
currently in gaol could have submitted a not guilty plea by using an insanity or mental 
impairment defence. This is undesirable given the legislation allows for indefinite custody 
orders to be made in such cases with the end result the accused will likely serve their custody 
order in a gaol in any event. 
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The principles of sentencing being punishment, deterrence of the offender and others, 
rehabilitation and protection of the community are firmly rooted in our judicial system 
whether by statute or at common law. The evidence is clear that absolute general deterrence is 
effective however its level of effectiveness is directly correlated to the likelihood of an 
offender getting caught. The same cannot be said for marginal general or specific deterrence. 
On the surface it seems like a logical concept however there is very little, if any, evidence to 
support it as effective. When attempting to apply the principles to each offender the 
determined sentence is often very difficult. The High Court has stated the principles are 
‘guideposts to the appropriate sentence but sometimes they point in different directions’.247 
Even more so with intellectually disabled offenders do the principles of deterrence have no 
sound basis. Deterrence is predicated on the rational being theory which some, if not most 
intellectually disabled offenders may have difficulty reconciling. When analysing Noel’s 
possible sentencing options it can be seen he is facing a term of immediate imprisonment. 
Given the sentencing principles of deterrence can be discounted as baseless this leaves 
punishment, protection of the community and rehabilitation. Too much emphasis on 
punishment would have a detrimental effect on the remaining two. Noel is an intellectually 
disabled man who needs appropriate treatment and rehabilitation to assist him in learning 
appropriate relationships and sexual behaviours. There is evidence to support community 
based interventions which would assist Noel and achieve the sentencing principles of 
rehabilitation and long term community protection. The sentencing legislation in its current 
form, albeit not perfect, would be able to accommodate such a sentence however it is up to 
the executive to start diverting some of the $125 925 it would cost to keep an intellectually 
disabled offender behind bars each and every year they are sentenced.
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